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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON REVIEW 
I. Whether the Court lacks jurisdiction to review an 
order of the Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission") 
concluding that the Commission has no jurisdiction over one-way 
paging as a result of the failure of Industrial Communications to 
seek review or rehearing by the Commissio|n. 
II. Whether the Court lacks jurisdiction to review a 
rule of the Commission that the Commission has no jurisdiction 
over one-way paging as a result of the failure of Industrial 
Communications to seek review or rehearing by the Commission or a 
determination in district court of the validity of the rule. 
III. Whether the Commission has jurisdiction over one-
way paging. 
IV. Whether the Commission acted appropriately in 
adopting a rule that it has no jurisdiction over one-way paging. 
V. Whether the Commission's rule that it has no juris-
diction over one-way paging is constitutional. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The interpretation of the following statutes is deter-
minative of the issues presented: Sections 54-2-1(20)(a)f 
54-2-1(30), 54-2-1(31), 54-4-1, 54-7-15, 54-7-16, 54-8b-l, 
54-8b-2, 54-8b-3, 54-8b-9, 63-46a-l, 63-46a-2 and 63-46a-13.1 
All statutory references in this brief will be to the 1986 
replacement volumes of the Utah Code Annotated 1953 unless other-
wise noted. The statutes referenced are set forth in Addendum A. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
NewVector Communications, Inc. ("NewVector") and The 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company ("Mountain Bell") 
sought leave to file a brief as amici curiae in this matter 
because of their interest in the jurisdiction of the Commission 
over providers of telecommunications services. They are particu-
larly interested in the effect of the Public Telecommunications 
Utility Law ("PTUL"), Section 54-8b-l et seq., on Commission 
jurisdiction over such providers. For reasons set forth below, 
they support the Commission's conclusion that it does not have 
jurisdiction over one-way paging. 
After leave to file a brief amici curiae was granted and 
while reviewing the record, it came to the attention of NewVector 
and Mountain Bell that procedural irregularities exist which 
appear to deprive the Court of jurisdiction to hear the con-
solidated cases. NewVector and Mountain Bell would prefer to 
have the Court reach and decide the substantive merits of the 
jurisdictional issues. However, as amici curiae, they believed 
they were obligated to bring these procedural issues to the 
Court's attention. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
These consolidated cases involve the Commission's juris-
diction over one-way paging services and the propriety of its 
adoption of a rule that it does not have such jurisdiction. The 
cases are before the Court on petitions for writs of certiorari 
filed by David R. Williams dba Industrial Communications 
("Industrial Communications") seeking review of an order of the 
Commission and a rule adopted by the Commission both to the 
effect that the Commission does not have jurisdiction over one-
way paging. 
Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On April 30, 1985, American Paging, Inc., of Utah 
("American Paging") filed an application with the Commission in 
Case No. 85-2007-01 for a certificate of convenience and 
necessity authorizing it to provide one-way paging service to the 
general public. (R. 52-76) Simultaneously, American Paging filed 
a motion to dismiss its application because the Commission lacked 
jurisdiction over paging. (R. 77-79) The motion was based on a 
prior Commission order dismissing the application of Page America 
of Utah, Inc. ("Page America") for a certificate to offer one-way 
paging service and amending or voiding the certificates of Mobile 
Telephone, Inc., Industrial Communications and Mobile Telephone 
Service of Southern Utah, Inc. insofar as they granted authority 
to offer paging service ("Page America ord^r"). (R. 77) The 
basis of the Page America order was the Commission's conclusion 
A copy of the Page America order is attached as Addendum B. 
that one-way paging service was not within the scope of the defi-
nitions of "telephone corporation" and "telephone line," 
§§ 54-2-1(30), 54-2-1(31), thus, depriving the Commission of 
jurisdiction to regulate paging. (R. 80-94) American Paging's 
motion was also based on the contention that the PTUL, enacted in 
1985, did not expand the jurisdiction of the Commission. (R. 78) 
On March 28, 1985, Industrial Communications intervened 
in Case No. 85-2007-01, protesting American Paging's application 
and objecting to its motion to dismiss. (R 123-24) On the same 
day, Industrial Communications moved to stay proceedings on 
American Paging's motion pending a decision on the appeal of the 
Page America order. (R. 122) 
On March 4, 1986, the Page America order was vacated in 
Williams v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 
1986), because the Commission did not comply with the requirements 
of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act ("UARA"), Section 
63-46a-l, et seq. 720 P.2d at 777. 
On March 18, 1986, in Case No. 86-999-06, the Commission 
proposed the following rule: "The Public Service Commission of 
Utah does not have jurisdiction over one-way paging services." 
(R. 20) A copy of the proposed rule was given to counsel for 
Industrial Communications on March 18, 1986 during a hearing in 
Case No. 85-2007-01. (R. 25) The proposed rule was filed with 
the Office of Administrative Rules on March 25, 1986 as Rule No. 
8304 (R. 20) and published in the Utah State Bulletin on April 
15, 1986. Industrial Communications took no action with respect 
to the proposed rule until May 15, 1986, when it filed an objec-
tion to the proposed rule and requested a public hearing. (R. 
22-23) The Commission adopted Rule No. 8304 ("Rule")3 effective 
May 16, 1986. (R. 49-50) 
On May 23, 1986, the Commission issued an order in Case 
No. 85-2007-01 granting American Paging1^ motion to dismiss its 
application for a certificate ("Order")/ (R. 235-37) The Order 
was based upon the Rule and upon the Commission's conclusion that 
the PUTL did not expand its jurisdiction bo include one-way 
paging. (R. 237) 
Industrial Communications did not file a petition for 
review or rehearing by the Commission of »~he Rule or of the 
Order or a declaratory judgment action with the district court 
seeking to determine the validity of the Rule. However, on June 
13, 1986, it filed petitions for review of the Rule and of the 
Order with this Court. (R. 258-59, 265-6*SU 
Statement of Facts 
No evidence was taken by the Commission in Case No. 
85-2007-01 on the Order or Case No. 86-999-06 on the Rule. 
However, the Commission did take evidence in Case No. 83-082-01 
A copy of the Rule is attached as Addendum C. 
A copy of the Order is attached as Adaendum D. 
before issuing the Page America order. Based upon that evidence, 
the Commission made the following findings of fact: 
2. Both of the protestants currently hold 
certificates of convenience and necessity from 
this Commission authorizing them to provide 
mobile radio-telephone service in various parts 
of the state, and in conjunction therewith to 
operate paging service as well. The grants of 
authority have been made at various times, and 
with a single exception have provided for 
authority to operate both mobile telephone and 
paging service. In 1974, the Commission issued 
a certificate to Mobile Telephone Service of 
Southern Utah, Inc. (which corporation is not 
a Protestant in this case) in Case No. 6969 
which dealt exclusively with the provision of 
paging service, and the Protestants cite that 
case to the Commission as determinative that 
the Commission has already decided the juris-
dictional issue herein. In one case, to be 
discussed hereafter, the Commission did assert 
jurisdiction over such service, but that case 
was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court, and in 
view of the Court's disposition of the same, we 
do not consider ourselves bound by it. As we 
will discuss hereafter, we do not believe that 
the Supreme Court has ruled in respect to the 
Commission's jurisdiction over paging services. 
3. Paging technology has been developing 
extremely rapidly over the past ten to fifteen 
years. Prior to that time, substantially the 
only method people had of ensuring that they be 
apprised of all calls when they were away from 
the phone, was to employ an answering service. 
The calling party would leave a message with 
the answering service, to be relayed when the 
customer of the answering service phoned in to 
get the messages. There was no way to let the 
customer know immediately when a message had 
been left. 
* * * 
7. Despite the rapid advances in the 
technology, and the potential for greater use-
fulness, the essential structure of the service 
remains the same, A caller uses the telephone 
system to reach the service and leave a message. 
The message is stored* There is then a retrans-
mission, either to alert the customer that there 
is a message, or to send it directly for voice 
or display. The retransmission may or may not 
involve use of the land lines. The service 
requires, by way of equipment, some means of 
answering the calls, storing the messages, 
transmitting the alert signal, and replaying 
the stored message. The only part which must 
be done electronically is the transmission of 
the alert signal. Obviously, a manual system 
for the other part of the operation would be 
intolerably cumbersome, and hence automated 
equipment to handle these aspects has been 
available for some time. Although this renders 
the establishment of such a system expensive, 
nevertheless, if one compares the capital of 
such an operation with that required for a land 
line telephone system, or similar fixed utility, 
they are relatively modest. Furthermore, the 
operation of such a system does not involve the 
installation and maintenance of a wide-spread, 
expensive physical distribution System. 
8. The Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) has allocated two primary bands for paging 
service. One, commonly known as the "high 
band", lies around 900 MHz. "Low band" lies 
around 35 and 43 MHz. The FCC has recently 
allocated 68 additional channels for the "high 
band" and 28 channels in the "lovf band". Be-
tween them, the two bands have had only eight 
channels heretofore. The FCC ha^ also con-
siderably liberalized its criteria for granting 
new licenses on these bands. 
9. In the wake of the FCC allocation of 
additional channels, and relaxation of licensing 
requirements, there has been a perceptible trend 
in a number of states toward relaxing regulation 
of paging services, or deregulating them alto-
gether. 
(R. 81-82, 84-85) 
NewVector and Mountain Bell do not believe these facts 
are controverted in these consolidated appeals and believe such 
facts were the basis for the Rule and Order. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
NewVector and Mountain Bell submit: first, that the 
Court lacks jurisdiction over these cases because Industrial 
Communications failed to comply with statutory prerequisites for 
appellate review; second, that the Commission does not have 
jurisdiction over paging services; and third, that the Commission's 
promulgation of the Rule defining its jurisdiction was appropriate 
and constitutional • 
The Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Order because 
Industrial Communications failed to seek rehearing or review of 
the Order by the Commission. Section 54-7-15 makes it mandatory 
for a party aggrieved by an order of the Commission to seek 
Commission review or rehearing before resorting to the courts. 
Industrial Communications' failure to apply for review or 
rehearing within 20 days after the issuance of the Order bars it 
from seeking judicial review of the Order. 
The Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Rule either 
because Industrial Communications failed to seek review or 
rehearing of the Rule by the Commission or because Industrial 
Communications has not sought to have the validity of the Rule 
determined in a declaratory judgment action in district court. 
If the Rule constitutes an order or decision of the Commission 
under Sections 54-7-15 and 54-7-16, this Court is the only court 
authorized to review the Rule. However, in that case, Industrial 
Communications would be required to seek review or rehearing of 
the Rule by the Commission before resorting to review by this 
Court* Having failed to do so within 20 days of the issuance of 
the Rulef Industrial Communications is barred from challenging 
the Rule. If, on the other hand, the Rule is not an order or 
decision of the Commission, Section 63-4£a~13 provides that 
Industrial Communications' remedy, if it disagrees with the Rule, 
is to bring a declaratory judgment action in district court to 
determine the validity of the Rule. 
The Rule and Order were within the authority of the 
Commission because the Commission does not have jurisdiction 
over paging under Chapter 2 of Title 54. In reviewing the 
Commission's jurisdiction, the Court should interpret the statutes 
strictly and accord deference to the Commission's interpretation 
of the statutes under which it operates, particularly insofar as 
such interpretation eases regulation in an increasingly com-
petitive telecommunications environment. The PTUL did not expand 
the Commission's jurisdiction. Moreover, the fact that the 
Commission incorrectly and inadvertently regulated paging ser-
vices for many years without statutory authority does not confer 
jurisdiction on the Commission. The Commission's jurisdiction is 
granted by statute and may not be enlarged by erroneous 
Commission action. 
The Commission's adoption of the Rule, which essentially 
amounts to its interpretation that one-way paging service is not 
a public utility service under Chapter 2 o£ Title 54 of the Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, was appropriate in light of the Commission's 
inadvertent regulation of one-way paging for many years. In 
adopting the Rule, the Commission fully complied with the provi-
sions of the UARA. Rulemaking was consistent with the UARA 
because the determination applies to a general class of persons 
and implements and interprets statutory policy. Rulemaking was 
also consistent with the Court's holding in Williams v, Public 
Service Commission of Utah, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986). 
The Rule does not deprive Industrial Communications of 
its property for a public use without just compensation. There-
fore, it complies with constitutional requirements. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION 
TO REVIEW THE ORDER 
Industrial Communications did not seek review or 
rehearing of the Order by the Commission prior to seeking review 
in this Court. That omission deprives the Court of jurisdiction 
to review the Order. 
Sections 54-7-15 and 54-7-16 set forth the requirements 
for review of a Commission order by the courts. Section 54-7-15 
states: 
Before any party . . . who is dissatisfied 
with an order or decision of the commission 
may commence legal action, the aggrieved party 
or person shall first proceed as provided in 
this section. 
(1) After any order or decision has been 
made by the commission any party to the 
action or proceeding . . . may apply for 
review or rehearing in respect to any 
matters determined in said action or pro-
ceeding specified in the application. 
The applicant shall make application to 
the commission for review or rehearing 
within 20 days after the ijssuance date of 
the order or decision. The application 
shall set forth specifically the grounds 
on which the applicant considers such 
decision or order to be unlawful. No 
applicant shall, in any court, urge or 
rely on any ground not set forth in the 
application . . . . 
Section 54-7-16 provides: 
Within thirty days after tljie applica-
tion for a rehearing is denied, or, if the 
application is granted, within tihirty days 
after the rendition of the decision on 
rehearing, the applicant or any party to the 
proceeding deeming himself aggrieved by such 
order or decision rendered upon rehearing may 
apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of cer-
tiorari for the purpose of having the 
lawfulness of the original order or decision, 
or the order or decision on rehearing, 
inquired into and determined . . . . No court 
of this state (except the Supreme Court to the 
extent herein specified) shall have jurisdic-
tion to review, reverse, correct or annul any 
order or decision of the commission . . . . 
In the present proceeding, Industrial Communications did 
not apply for review or rehearing before t}he Commission within 
20 days of the date of the Order. In Utah Department of Business 
Regulation v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 602 P.2d 696 
(Utah 1979), the Court held that failure olf a party to apply for 
rehearing with the Commission within the time established by 
Section 54-7-15 deprived the Court of jurisdiction over the 
dispute. Id. at 699. 
It is clear from both Utah cases and the plain language 
of the statute that Commission rehearing is a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to appellate review. Therefore, Case No. 860313 
dealing with review of the Order must be dismissed. 
II. 
THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION 
TO REVIEW THE RULE 
The Rule is either a decision of the Commission under 
Sections 54-7-15 and 54-7-16 or it is not. If the Rule is deemed 
a decision of the Commission, Section 54-7-15 requires Industrial 
Communications to seek review or rehearing by the Commission 
before seeking review by the Court. If the Rule is not deemed a 
decision, Section 63-46a-13 provides that its validity is to be 
determined in a declaratory judgment action in the district 
court. Thus, whether the Rule is a decision or not/ Industrial 
Communications1 failure to apply for review or rehearing by the 
Commission or to seek a declaratory judgment in district court 
deprives the Court of jurisdiction to review the Rule. 
The Utah Code provides only two ways to obtain review of 
Commission actions. As discussed in Point I, if a Commission 
action is characterized as an order or decision, it may be 
reviewed only after timely application for review or rehearing by 
the Commission and then only by the Supreme Court. §§ 54-7-15, 
54-7-16. If the action is characterized as a rule, as opposed to 
an order or decision, Section 63-46a-13(l) provides that: 
The validity or applicability of a rule may 
be determined in an action for declaratory 
judgment in any district court of this state 
with appropriate venue, if it is alleged that 
the rule, or its potential application, inter-
feres with or impairs, or threatens to inter-
fere with or impair, the legal rights or 
privileges of the plaintiff. 
This section derives from Section 7 of the Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act. Washington also adopted this sec-
tion with some modifications, the most significant of which was 
that, instead of permitting the action to be brought "in any 
district court of this state with appropriate venue," Washington's 
statute provides that the action must be brought in "the Superior 
Court of Thurston County." Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 34.04.070(1) 
(1986). 
In Sim v. Washington State Parks and Recreation 
Commission, 90 Wash.2d 378, 538 P.2d 1193 (1978), the Washington 
Supreme Court considered the meaning of the word "may" as used in 
the statute. Sim brought an action in a court other than the 
Superior Court of Thurston County to enjoin the agency from 
enforcing a regulation. The agency attempted to have the matter 
dismissed for improper venue. Sim contended that the matter was 
not an action for declaratory judgment and, therefore, need not 
be brought in Thurston County. The lower I court ruled in favor of 
Sim on the ground that Section 34.04.070 did not provide exclu-
sive venue because the statute was merely permissive. On appeal, 
the Washington Supreme Court reversed. It} held that the nature 
of the action was one for declaratory relief regardless of the 
fact that Sim styled it as an injunctive action. On the question 
whether Section 34.04,070 was permissive, the court said: 
In our view the use of the word "may" in this 
statute operates to grant permission to bring 
the pertinent petition in a certain form. The 
form is that of a declaratory judgment. If a 
party chooses to bring a declaratory judgment 
petition challenging the validity of a state 
agency rule, the statute provides only one 
place in which to file it: Thurston County. 
Thus, the provision for venue is clearly 
exclusive unless, under some other statutory 
provision, the legislature has authorized 
venue elsewhere. 
583 P.2d at 1195. 
Here, as in Sim, the use of the word "may" in Section 
63-46a-13 does not give Industrial Communications the option of 
commencing an action on the Rule in district court or of seeking 
review of the Rule in this Court. Rather, it gives Industrial 
Communications permission to test the validity of the Rule in an 
action for declaratory judgment in an appropriate district court 
should it choose to do so. 
The conclusion is inescapable that Industrial 
Communications was required to comply either with Sections 
54-7-15 and 54-7-16 or Section 63-46a-13. It has failed to 
comply with either. Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to 
review the Rule. 
III. 
THE COMMISSION DOES NOT HAVE 
JURISIDICTION OVER PAGING 
Industrial Communications essentially argues that the 
Order and Rule are invalid because they amount to a deregulation 
of paging without compliance with the requirements of the Public 
Telecommunications Utility Law ("PTUL"). The Commission cannot 
and need not exempt paging from regulation under PTUL unless it 
has jurisdiction over it. Therefore, the premise of Industrial 
Communications' argument is that the Commission has jurisdiction 
over paging. NewVector and Mountain Bell disagree with that fun-
damental premise. 
A« The Commission's Jurisdiction Should Be Strictly Construed• 
The Commission's power of regulation is a delegation 
of legislative authority. Because that delegation imposes 
regulatory burdens on certain businesses that are not imposed on 
businesses generallyf it should be strictly construed. 
In Basin Flying Service v. Public Service Commission of 
Utah, 531 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1975), the Court considered whether a 
nonscheduled airline was a public utility subject to regulation 
by the Commission. Before reviewing the definition of "common 
carrier" in Section 54-2-1, the Court observed that 
the rule is fundamental that restraints or 
duties imposed by law must be clear and une-
quivocal . 
In harmony with this, it is well established 
that a regulatory body such as the Public 
Service Commission, which is created by and 
derives its powers and duties from statute, 
has no inherent regulatory powers, but only 
those which are expressly granted, or which 
are clearly implied as necessary to the 
discharge of the duties and responsibilities 
imposed upon it. 
531 P.2d at 1305. Consistent with this philosophy of regulatory 
restraint, the Court held that because Section 54-2-1(8)(d) 
included the word "scheduled/" a nonscheduled airline was not a 
public utility and not subject to regulation. 
The principle of strict construction of definitional 
requirements for public utilities has also been followed in other 
cases. In Medic-Call/ Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Utah/ 
24 Utah 2d 273f 470 P.2d 258 (1970)/ the Court held that a paging 
service whose users were limited to subscribing physicians was 
not a public utility because it was not available to the public 
generally as required by Section 54-2-1(20). Similarly/ in 
Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center/ Inc. v. Public Service Commis-
sion/ 558 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1977), the Court held that a shopping 
center that produced and distributed electricity entirely within 
private property which was sold only to its tenants was not a 
public utility. 
In
 Public Service Commission of Wyoming v. Formal 
Complaint of WWZ Co.f 641 P.2d 183 (Wyo. 1982)/ the Wyoming 
Supreme Court held that a private sewage disposal company was not 
subject to regulation of the Wyoming commission. The court said: 
Section 54-2-1(8)(d) was previously part of Section 54-2-1(14) 
in Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 6Af 1974). 
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 Section 54-2-1(20) was previously Section 54-2-1(30) in Utah 
Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 6Ar 1974). 
[T]he statutes creating and empowering the PSC 
must be strictly construed and any reasonable 
doubt of the existence of any power must be 
resolved against the exercise thereof. 
[Citation omitted*] 
Id. at 186. 
B# The Commission Has Strictly Interpreted Its Jurisdiction 
Section 54-4-1 grants the Commission authority "to 
supervise and regulate every public utility in this state • . . ." 
Section 54-2-1(20)(a) defines public utility for purposes rele-
vant to this appeal as "every . . . telephone corporation . . . 
where the service is performed for . . . the public generally 
. . . ." Section 54-2-1(30) defines telephone corporation as 
"every corporation and person . . . owningf controlling, 
operating, or managing any telephone line for public service 
within this state . . . ." Finally, Section 54-2-1(31) provides 
that 
"Telephone line" includes all conduits, 
ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments, and 
appliances, and all other real estate, fix-
tures, and personal property owned, controlled, 
operated, or managed in connection with or to 
facilitate communication by telephone whether 
that communication is had with or without the 
use of transmission wires. 
In interpreting the key definition of "telephone line" 
in the Page America order, the Commission said: 
5. The distinction between paging and 
telephone service is critical because if in 
defining "telephone line" one focuses on the 
phrase "facilitate telephone communication," 
the scope of potentially regulated services 
becomes staggering. Conceivably the 
Commission should then regulate all suppliers 
of telephone equipment/ e.g. Radio Shack, 
Sears, J* C. Penney, Panasonic; suppliers of 
wiring components; all suppliers of telephone 
directories, including the many not affiliated 
with the Bell system; telephone answering ser-
vices, telephone answering devices and all 
such suppliers; radio talk stations; newspaper 
classified advertising, aci absurdum. The 
focus instead should be on the connotation of 
telephone service which implies interactive, 
and at least potentially extended two-way com-
munication* That was certainly the focus in 
1917 when the statute was enacted, since most 
of the services now technologically feasible 
were not foreseen at that time. Paging ser-
vice is conceptually no different from 
answering services (which have never been 
considered appropriate objects of state 
regulation); it is the same service offered 
through a different medium. Telephone service 
over land lines or radio waves is fundamen-
tally the same service irrespective of the 
means of transmission. But telephone service 
is a two-way service; paging service is one-way 
call notification, 
6. Finally, we consider it appropriate 
to evaluate paging service in the context of 
the traditional characteristics which have 
warranted granting of a state-regulated mono-
poly. Historically, legislatures have 
narrowly circumscribed the conditions which 
justify such a departure from a free market 
economy. Those conditions have generally 
included the providing of a service which is 
deemed necessary and essential to the citi-
zenry, the existence of natural monopolies 
because of significant capital investment 
necessary to achieve economies of scale in pro-
duction, and the efficient use of minimally 
intrusive riqhts of way across land. An 
objective analysis of paging service persuades 
us to conclude the following: 
(a) Paging is a valuable con-
venience for a small but growing number of 
people. Industrial presented information to 
the effect that it has the capacity to serve 
200,000 paging subscribers, but presently ser-
ves approximately 2,500 subscribers. While 
paging is beneficial and efficient in aiding 
instant response to telephone calls, we cannot 
say that the service is a necessary public 
service in the sense that water, electricity, 
natural gas and basic telephone service are 
necessary to the well-being of the citizenry, 
nor can it be said that a significant number 
of telephone customers avail themselves of the 
service• 
(b) The capital necessary to pro-
vide paging service is not substantial com-
pared to the capital commitments common to 
other utility services. 
(c) The public is not incon-
venienced by the plant or transmission of 
paging signals in the way it would be incon-
venienced by unlimited electric companies 
seeking transmission rights of way. Whether 
there are three or three hundred paging com-
panies, the intrusion upon land would be 
minimal. 
(d) Paging may have been a service 
in short supply because the FCC imposed severe 
limits to market entry by restricting frequen-
cies within the RF spectrum; however, the FCC 
decision to release 96 new frequencies signi-
ficantly alters the supply consideration and 
represents a major federal policy to libera-
lize market access and foster competition in 
the paging industry. 
(e) If competition can produce ser-
vice and price benefits to paging customers, 
there would appear to be no substantial reason 
for this Commission to exercise jurisdiction. 
Certainly there would be obvious advantages to 
the Protestants if market entry were 
restricted, but the purpose of state regula-
tion isn't to protect the interests of regu-
lated companies for their own sake; it is to 
protect the public interest. Conceivably, 
there will be many market entrants, and it is 
likely that some will flourish and some will 
fail. We see no significant risk to the 
public if some providers failf and we are 
persuaded that the open market will in time be 
the best safeguard of the public interest, 
both in terms of price and service. 
(f) The Protestants urge the 
Commission to assert jurisdiction to preclude 
duplication of facilities, but duplication is 
the essence of competition, and such a policy 
would be rational only if the investment 
necessary to launch a paging service were 
vastly greater than it is. 
The Commission's interpretation of the definition of 
"telephone line" to focus on two-way communication is consistent 
with the policy of regulatory restraint and avoids the absurd 
extension of jurisdiction that would be compelled by a broad 
reading of the definition. Statutes are not to be interpreted in 
a manner that produces absurd consequences. Curtis v. Harmon 
Electronics, Inc. , 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978). 
C. The Commission's Interpretation of Its Jurisdiction Should 
Be Accorded Deference by the CourtT 
The interpretation by an administrative agency of the 
statutes under which it operates, although not binding, is to be 
accorded deference by a reviewing court. In Utah Department of 
Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 
601 (Utah 1983), the Court considered the standard of review of 
various types of decisions by the Commission. With respect to 
Commission interpretation "of the operative provisions of the 
statutory law it is empowered to administer," the Court said: 
In reviewing agency decisions of this type, we 
apply what we have called the "time honored 
rule of law . • • that the construction of 
statutes by governmental agencies charged with 
their administration should be given con-
siderable weight . . . ." An agency's inter-
pretation of key provisions of the statute it 
is empowered to administer is often inseparable 
from its application of the rules of law to the 
basic facts, discussed above. In reviewing 
decisions such as these, a court should afford 
great deference to the technical expertise or 
more extensive experience of the responsible 
agency. But, on issues of special law, as with 
other issues under this heading, the decision of 
the Commission is subject to judicial review 
under the standard elucidated here. 
The degree of deference extended to the 
decisions of the Commission on these issues 
. . . [is] that the Commission's decision must 
fall within the limits of reasonableness or 
rationality. [Citations omitted.] 
Id. at 610. 
I n
 Big K Corporation v. Public Service Commission of 
Utah, 689 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1984), the Court appears to have 
moderated this standard somewhat, noting that 
Even with respect to the Commission's 
construction of its organic statute, we do not 
defer unless the Commission by virtue of 
expertise and experience with the regulatory 
scheme is in a superior position to give 
effect to the regulatory objectives to be 
achieved . . . . 
Id. at 1353. 
Even assuming that the Big K standard does accord less 
deference to Commission interpretation of its jurisdiction than 
Department of Administrative Services, the standard of review 
to be applied in this case is still one of deference to the 
Commission. Here, the Commission has interpreted its jurisdic-
tion over one segment of the telecommunications industry in light 
of the significant technological and federal regulatory develop-
ments in that segment and in the industry in general. The 
Commission has concluded that a broad reading of the definition 
of telephone corporation to include paging would lead to absurd 
consequences with respect to other segments of the telecom-
munications industry. That conclusion is clearly based on the 
Commission's experience and expertise in dealing with the 
increasingly competitive telecommunications industry and with the 
accomplishment of regulatory objectives in the new environment. 
Even prior to the breakup of the American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company ("AT&T") pursuant to United States v. American 
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982)f 
aff'd sub nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), 
significant competition was developing in traditionally regulated 
services. In 1968f the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") 
opened the customer equipment sector of the industry to com-
petition as the result of the availability of competitive equip-
ment. Use of Carterfone Device, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, reconsideration 
denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968). 
In 1971, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") 
determined that 
a general policy in favor of entry of new 
carriers in the specialized communications 
field would serve the public interest, con-
venience and necessity . . . . 
• * * 
[I]t is not necessary or desirable in the 
public interest to hold comparative hearings 
for the purpose of restricting new entry in 
any particular area to only one private line 
applicant. 
Specialized Common Carrier Services, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 920, 926 
(1971), aff' d sub nom., Washington Utilities & Transportation 
Commission v. Federal Communications Commission, 513 F.2d 1142 
(9th Cir.), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975). 
Requirements and restrictions imposed on former members 
of the Bell system by the Plan of Reorganization adopted pursuant 
to U.S. v. AT&T and approved in United States v. Wetern Electric 
Co., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom., California 
v. United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983), have resulted in further 
competition in telecommunications. Economists have begun to 
question whether modern technology has not rendered the natural 
monopoly rationale for regulation otiose. Stelzer, A Policy 
Guide for Utility Executives: "Know When to Hold'Em; Know When 
to Fold1Em," Pub. Util. Fort., Oct. 9, 1980, at 62. 
All public utilities tend to pass through four stages of 
development. In the first stage, the technology is developed, 
and monopoly status may be desirable because of the narrow market 
available. In the second stage, the public utility seeks regula-
tion in order to stabilize its growth and establish legitimacy. 
In the third stage, utilities tend to encounter competitive 
pressure as a result of new technological breakthroughs, and 
encourage regulation in order to preserve monopoly status. In 
the fourth stage, they yield to competitive pressures and seek to 
return to a conventional competitive market. Wilcox and Shepherd, 
Public Policies Toward Business, 348-49 (5th Ed. 1975) The tele-
communications industry in general, and paging in particular, is 
clearly in a transition between the third and fourth stages. 
The purpose for regulation of public utilities is to 
serve as a substitute for free market competition. In Utah Gas 
Service Co. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 18 Utah 2d 310, 422 P.2d 
530 (1967), the Court described this overriding regulatory objec-
tive as follows: 
[D]uplication of facilities would be so waste-
ful and impractical that the law provides for 
the granting of monopolistic franchises, as a 
consequence of which such utilities are deemed 
to submit to regulation by public authority, 
which in a measure, substitutes for the 
controls usually imposed upon business by free 
competition. 
422 P.2d at 532-33. Professor Alfred Kahn confirmed this point 
when he said: 
The essence of regulation is the explicit 
replacement of competition with governmental 
orders as the principal institutional device 
for assuring good performance. 
1 Kahn, The Economics of Regulation, 20 (1970). 
This principle applies with equal force to a market in 
which the number of participants is severely limited by economic 
factors such as significant barriers to entry or dominant economies 
of scale as it does to a pure monopoly. 
As noted in the statement of facts, there has been a 
tremendous increase in availability of radio channels for paging, 
the capital investment required to enter the paging market is 
relatively insignificant, duplication of facilities does not 
impose undue burdens on public rights-of-way and paging is a 
luxury used by only a relatively small segment of the public. In 
addition to making numerous new radio channels available for 
paging, the FCC has recently issued an order preempting state 
regulation which has the effect of prohibiting or impeding entry 
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into paging or two-way mobile services. In this context and 
based upon its expertise and experience, the strict interpreta-
tion of the jurisdictional statutes by the Commission should be 
accorded deference by the Court because it is consistent with the 
objectives of regulation. The recent history of the telecom-
munications industry is one of increasing competition and 
decreasing need for regulation. 
D« The Commission's Interpretation Does Not Confict with 
Precedent 
The Commission's construction of Section 54-2-1(31) to 
exclude one-way paging from its jurisdiction does not conflict 
with any prior interpretation of that section. 
In Medic-Call, the Court "did not reach the issue of 
whether publicly available paging service . . . would be a public 
utility . . . ." Williams, 720 P.2d at 777 n. 9. To the 
contrary, language of the Court implied that problems would arise 
In the Matter of Preemption of State Entry Regulation in the 
Public Land Mobile Service, 59 P&F Rad. Reg. 1518 (Rel. Mar. 31, 
1986) (CC Dkt. 85-89, RM-4811). This order has been stayed 
pending appeal. 
from including paging within the definition of public utility. 
The Court said: 
The service is comparable to that which 
would be rendered by runners or call boys to 
notify doctors that they were wanted on the 
phone. One wonders just how the defendant 
would go about regulating the service even if 
it had the power to do so. 
If defendants can regulate the service ren-
dered by plaintiffs herein, could they not 
with equal propriety regulate the semaphore 
signaling of the boy scouts or the smoke 
signals of the Indians on a hunting expedi-
tion? 
Medic-Call, 470 P.2d at 260. 
In Williams v, Hyrum Gibbons & Sons Co., 602 P.2d 684 
(Utah 1979), the Court considered the definition of telephone 
line in determining if Industrial Communications was a public 
utility with the power of eminent domain. While the Court noted 
that Industrial Communications offered paging, it focused on 
radio-telephone or mobile telephone communications in holding 
that "telephone line" should be interpreted liberally to include 
such service. Id. at 686-87. 
E. The PTUL Did Not Expand the Commission's Jurisdiction. 
In enacting the PTUL, the Legislature vested the Com-
mission with authority partially or wholly to exempt telecom-
munications corporations or services from some or all of the 
regulatory requirements of Title 54. § 54-8b-3. It also 
approved competitive negotiations by telecommunications cor-
porations for services subject to Commission approval. § 54-8b-4. 
For purposes of the PTUL, the Legislature adopted broad defini-
tions of "public telecommunications services" and "telecommunica-
tions corporation." § 54-8b-2. However, in Section 54-8b-9, it 
specifically provided that 
Nothing is this chapter shall be construed 
to enlarge or reduce the commission's juris-
diction over the services and entities for 
which jurisdiction is provided or excluded by 
other provisions of this title. 
Industrial Communications argues that the PTUL expands 
Commission jurisdiction because the definitions of "telecommuni-
cations corporation" and "public telecommunications services" in 
it are broader than those of "telephone line" and "telephone cor-
poration" in Chapter 2 of Title 54 and because the PTUL act was 
entitled: 
AN ACT RELATING TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION; CLARIFYING THE AUTHORITY OF THE 
PSC TO REGULATE INTRASTATE PUBLIC TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS SERVICES; AND PROVIDING A METHOD OF 
EXEMPTING CERTAIN SERVICES FROM REGULATION. 
1985 Utah Laws, ch. 257. On the basis of these definitions and 
the title, Industrial Communications argues that the Legislature 
intended to make it clear that paging service was within the 
Commission's jurisdiction in enacting the PTUL. 
Even assuming Industrial Communications is correct about 
legislative intent, its argument must fail because the PTUL is not 
subject to construction — it is clear and unambiguous. Further-
more, even if some ambiguity is deemed created by the PTUL, it 
must be resolved in favor of the Commission's more restrictive 
interpretation of its jurisdiction under principles of statutory 
construction, 
I. The Court May Look to Legislative Intent Only If 
the Statute Is Ambiguous, 
Even assuming the title and definitions of the PTUL 
might be deemed to indicate a legislative intent to redefine 
Commission jurisdiction, the Court cannot embark upon a con-
sideration of legislative intent unless it determines that the 
PTUL is ambiguous. The Court does not have authority to construe 
an act which is clear on its face, even if the act is incon-
sistent with a clear legislative intent. 
In State v, Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911 (Utah 1974), the 
defendant was charged with aggravated assault under Section 
76-5-103 (Supp. 1973), Unfortunately, in enacting Section 
76-5-103, which provided for the crime of aggravated assault, an 
error in referencing a definitional section was made. The Court, 
recognizing the obvious statutory error, nonetheless dismissed 
the charge stating: 
There is nothing ambiguous about the sta-
tute in the instant matter; it simply does not 
state a crime, and we are not empowered to 
state one for the legislators simply because 
it seems certain that they intended to state 
one themselves, 
526 P.2d at 912. 
In Utah State Democratic Committee v. Monson, 652 P.2d 
890 (Utah 1982), the Court affirmed that "there is nothing to 
construe when there is no ambiguity in a statute." 652 P.2d at 
893. See also H • L v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907f 913 (Utah 
1979). 
2. The PTUL Is Not Ambiguous. 
The definitions of "telecommunications corporation" and 
"public telecommunications services" in Section 54-8b-2 are 
restricted in their application solely to the PTUL. The fact 
that a larger universe of entities and services could be exempted 
from regulation under the PTUL than were subject to regulation 
under the balance of Title 54 does not create an ambiguity in the 
PTUL. No damage results if the Commission exempts from regula-
tion an entity or service which it has no jurisdiction to regu-
late. Damage results only if the Commission regulates entities 
or services which it has no jurisdiction to regulate or fails to 
regulate entities or services which it should regulate. The PTUL 
deals with exemption, not regulation. 
With regard to the possible ambiguity created by the 
clarification language in the title of the PTUL act, it is well 
established that the title of an act is relevant in its construc-
tion only if there is some ambiguity in the act itself. The 
title of an act is not a part of the act and cannot modify the 
express terms of the act. American Electric Power Service Corp. 
v. State, 619 P.2d 314, 315 (Utah 1980); Great Salt Lake Authority 
v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d, 963, 964-65, 
reh. 18 Utah 2d 276, 421 P.2d 504, 505 (1966); American Smelting 
& Refining Co. v. State Tax Commission, 16 Utah 2d 147, 397 P.2d 
67, 70 (1964). 
In American Electric Power Service Corp., the title of 
an act indicated that the Legislature intended to amend a section 
of the code on licensing. However, the body of the act, 
apparently by mistake, amended a section of the code on safety. 
The Court said: 
resort cannot be had to the title of an act 
for the purpose of enlarging the scope of the 
statute so as to include a subject not fairly 
expressed in the body of the act. 
619 P.2d at 315. In Great Salt Lake Authority, the Court refused 
to look to the title of the act in question, which clarified its 
application, even though it held the act invalid because of 
uncertainty in its application. 421 P.2d at 505. 
There is no reference in the PTUL to any clarification 
of the authority of the Commission. That reference is found only 
in the title of the act. 1985 Utah Laws, ch. 257. To the 
contrary, the body of the act expresses an unambiguous legisla-
tive intent to leave the Commission's jurisdiction as it was 
prior to the act. § 54-8b-9. 
In any event, there may be no ambiguity created by the 
title. In the context of Section 54-8b-9, it is reasonable to 
assume that the express granting of authority to exempt entities 
from regulation, which is a new concept in Title 54, was the 
jurisdictional clarification intended by the Legislature. It 
would have been simple enough for the Legislature to amend 
Section 54-2-1(30) by substituting Section 54-8b-2(2) and (3), 
Section 54-2-1(31) by substituting Section 54-8b-2(4) and Section 
54-2-1(20) by substituting "telecommunications" for "telephone" 
had it intended to broaden the definition of "public utility" 
with respect to telecommunications services. 
3* The Commission's Interpretation of Its Jurisdiction 
Is Correct Even Assuming the PTUL Creates Ambiguity* 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the PTUL 
creates ambiguity, such ambiguity arises only in the context of 
the balance of Title 54 and not within the PTUL itself. Section 
54-8b-2 defines telecommunications corporation and services more 
broadly than Sections 54-2-1(30) and 54-2-1(31) define telephone 
corporation and line. Assuming there is some ambiguity created 
by these different definitions, the more restrictive definitions 
of Sections 54-2-1(30) and 54-2-1(31) control under principles of 
statutory construction. 
First, the rule of regulatory restraint enunciated in 
Basin Flying Service, compels a restrictive construction of the 
statutes. 531 P.2d at 1305. If there is ambiguity, there is 
doubt, and the doubt should be resolved in favor of Chapter 2's 
more restrictive definitions. 
Second, a reading of the entire Title together, 
attempting to give effect to all of its parts, Great Salt Lake 
Authority, 414 P.2d at 964, indicates that the principal function 
of the PTUL was to provide a means to exempt some aspects of the 
telecommunications business from regulation. The broader uni-
verse defined in the PTUL which is clearly restricted in its 
application solely to Chapter 8b, should, therefore, be construed 
as being limited, by implication, to the universe of entities 
already subject to jurisdiction under the definitions in Chapter 
2 which are applicable to the entirety of Title 54. 
Third, even absent a policy of regulatory restraint, 
specific provisions such as the definitions in Chapter 2 prevail 
over more general expressions such as the definitions in the PTUL. 
Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 1980). 
Fourth, in enacting a new statute, the Legislature is 
presumed to be aware of previous statutes relating to the same 
subject matter. Absent express repeal or amendment, it is pre-
sumed that the new act was enacted consistent with the prior act 
and that no implied repeal or amendment was intended unless the 
statutes are irreconcilable. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 
(Utah 1983); State v. Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 335-36 (Utah 1980). 
Section 54-8b-9 makes it absolutely clear that Section 54-8b-2 
was not intended to amend or repeal Sections 54-2-1(30) or (31) 
by implication or otherwise. 
F. Prior Regulation of One-Way Paging Does Not Confer 
Jurisdiction on the Commission 
Industrial Communications contends that the Commission's 
regulation of one-way paging for many years precludes it from 
issuing the Order and adopting the Rule. Such an argument cannot 
prevail. Otherwise, the Commission could endow itself with 
authority through erroneous statutory interpretation. 
In Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 107 Utah 24, 
151 P.2d 467 (1944), the Court considered whether an agreement 
between the hotel and the Industrial Commission regarding contri-
butions to the unemployment compensation fund for performing 
bands and specialty acts precluded the commission from adopting a 
contrary interpretation of the statute. The Court held that the 
commission was not so precluded, reasoning that: 
The Commission had the authority to interpret 
the Act, for such is a necessary condition 
precedent to its administration, but such 
interpretation was not binding. . . . 
The point involved in the settlement of the 
earlier group of cases was whether, under Sec. 
42-2a-19, the hotel company was an employer of 
the orchestra members or not. In the 
agreement the Commission concluded that "name 
bands" and "speciality features" were not 
within the statute. This was purely a 
question of law and the erroneous interpreta-
tion of the statute by the Commission could 
not have the effect of changing liability 
under the statute nor of estopping the 
Commission from later changing its interpreta-
tion. 
In so holding, we appreciate the fact that 
the hotel company is now in a position under 
which it will be penalized for abiding by and 
relying upon a regulation or interpretation of 
the Department of Employment Security. This 
interpretive agreement was, after all, pro-
mulgated by the state's own agency and the 
individual who chooses to conform to it rather 
than ignore it should not suffer from his law 
abiding attitude even though he bases his 
actions on an invalid regulation. Therefore, 
as a general proposition we sympathize with 
the view that an individual should not have to 
run the risk of a change of administrative 
interpretation which may result in a retroac-
tive change in regulations to his disadvan-
tage. Although, in view of these factors a 
contrary result might seem to be a desirable 
one when applied to the facts of this par-
ticular case, the consequences which will flow 
from such a holding strike at the very heart 
of the relationships between administrative 
tribunals, the legislature and the courts. 
Ijd. 151 P.2d at 470. 
Here, the case is stronger because the Commission never 
considered the interpretation of the definition of "telephone 
line" as applied to paging until 1983. It simply granted appli-
cations for certificates of convenience and necessity to render 
paging service, usually in conjunction with mobile telephone ser-
vice, without considering its jurisdiction. 
Husky Oil Co. of Delaware v. State Tax Commission of 
Utah, 556 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976), does not undermine the holding 
of Utah Hotel. In Husky, the Tax Commission attempted to levy 
use taxes on the purchase of a piece of equipment sold in an 
occasional sale not in the normal course of the seller's busi-
ness. The Court held that the commission's position was contrary 
to the correct interpretation of a statutory exemption for such 
The discussion in Husky regarding the effect of a change 
in regulation arose only because the commission argued that its 
recent adoption of a new regulation should govern the interpreta-
tion of the statute. In responding to that argumentf the Court 
first noted that on two occasions previously it had interpreted 
the statute differently than the new regulation did and that the 
new regulation was inconsistent with the language of the statute. 
The Court then went on to note that a prior regulation of the 
commission which had been in effect for 34 years and which was 
consistent with the statute added weight to the Court's interpre-
tation of the statute. 
Husky clearly does not stand for the proposition that an 
erroneous statutory interpretation will become binding simply 
because it has gone unchallenged or uncorrected for many years. 
Celebrity Clubf Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 
602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979), likewise does not detract from Utah 
Hotel. In Celebrity Club, the Court held that the Liquor Control 
Commission was estopped to modify its determination that a pri-
vate club was not located within 600 feet of a school where the 
club's building had been relocated and constructed specifically 
in reliance on that determination. The Court also noted the 
ambiguity of the statute in question and posed various reasonable 
constructions of the statute and possible factual findings which 
could have been made, but which were not considered by the com-
mission, any of which would have allowed licensing of the club. 
In discussing the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the Court 
observed that it must be applied cautiously against the State and 
only "if necessary to prevent manifest injustice, and the exer-
cise of governmental powers will not be impaired." 602 P.2d at 694. 
In Utah Hotely the hotel was required to make contribu-
tions to the unemployment compensation fund which it would not 
have been required to make had the incorrect interpretation 
of the statute not been corrected. However, there was absolutely 
no indication that the hotel would have conducted its affairs 
differently had the Tax Commission never misinterpreted the sta-
tute. To the contrary, the hotel regularly scheduled bands on 
which it had to pay contributions even under the misinterpreta-
tion. In Celebrity Club, a building was relocated and then 
constructed specifically in reliance on the Liquor Control 
Commission's interpretation of the statute. Under the new 
interpretation by the Commission, the building was rendered use-
less to the club and the investment was wasted. 
Here, unlike Utah Hotel or Celebrity Club, the 
Commission never interpreted the jurisdictional statutes until 
the present controvery arose in 1983. The implicit interpreta-
tion of the statute involved in granting an application for a 
certificate to paging providers in the past is as much the 
responsibility of those providers as it is of the Commission. 
They applied for the certificates implying to the Commission that 
it did have jurisdiction. In all but one case, paging was only a 
tag-along in their applications to mobile or other telephone ser-
vice which is subject to regulation. 
Furthermoref there is no reason to believe that Industrial 
Communications would have conducted its affairs significantly 
differently had the Commission addressed the issue many years 
ago and determined that it had no jurisdiction over paging. 
Industrial Communications still would have needed a certificate 
to offer mobile telephone service and presumably would have 
applied for one. Its understanding of the exclusivity or mono-
poly power it would have enjoyed in paging service would not have 
changed* Industrial Communications was the third mobile 
telephone provider certificated in the major Wasatch Front 
markets and then only after the Court held that the two existing 
providers had no right to be protected from competition. 
Williams v. Public Service Commission of Utahf 29 Utah 2d 9, 504 
P.2d 34, 37 (1972) . 
Finally, Industrial Communications is not deprived of 
the use of its paging facilities by the Order or Rule. To the 
contrary, it is free to use them without the burdens of regula-
tion. 
The fact that the Commission may have mistakenly and 
inadvertently regulated paging services for several years does 
not prevent the Commission from correcting its mistake under the 
circumstances presented and cannot be deemed to amend the 
legislative grant of authority to the Commission. 
rv. 
THE COMMISSION'S ADOPTION OF 
THE RULE WAS APPROPRIATE 
Given that the Commission had inadvertently and mista-
kenly regulated paging for several years, the question arises how 
the Commission could correct its error. In the Page America 
order, it attempted to do so by entering an order after an evi-
dentiary hearing concluding that it had no jurisdiction and 
voiding the certificates erroneously issued previously to parties 
that were before it in that case. In Williams, 720 P.2d 773, the 
Court held that the Page America order was not the appropriate 
way to correct the error and stated that a rulemaking proceeding 
would be. Therefore, on remand, the Commission initiated a rule-
making proceeding and adopted a rule in compliance with the Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act ("UARA"). Industrial Communications 
not only challenges compliance with the UARAf but also goes 
further in effect contending that the Commission could not 
correct its error through a rulemaking proceeding. NewVector and 
Mountain Bell submit that the Commission complied with the UARA 
and that rulemaking was the appropriate way to correct the error. 
A #
 The Commission Complied with the Requirements of the UARA« 
The briefs of the Commission and American Paging 
discuss compliance with the UARA at some length. NewVector 
and Mountain Bell agree with those arguments and do not believe 
it is necessary to repeat them here. They wish only to add two 
comments. 
First, with respect to the question of notice, publica-
tion of the proposed rule in the Utah State Bulletin would be 
deemed to provide constructive notice to interested persons 
whether they had actual notice or not under generally accepted 
principles. See Federal Crop Insurance Corporation v. Merrill, 
332 U.S. 380, 384-85 (1947). Here, the Rule was published in the 
Utah State Bulletin and Industrial Communications had actual 
notice. (R. 20, 25) 
Second, with respect to information required by Section 
63-46a-4(3) to be included in the notice, NewVector and Mountain 
Bell note that the items identified in the statute are the pre-
cise items specified in the Administrative Analysis Notice of 
Proposed Rule form utilized by the Commission and delivered to 
Industrial Communications. (R. 20) Therefore, Industrial 
Communications1 claim that the necessary information was not 
supplied is simply incorrect. 
It is apparent that the Commission complied with the 
UARA and that the Rule should not be invalidated for non-
compliance. 
B. The Adoption of the Rule Was Appropriate. 
The more serious contention raised by Industrial Communi-
cations is that the Rule is invalid because it is not an appro-
priate way to deregulate paging. Industrial Communications 
contends that exemption under the PTUL is the only way to deregu-
late a service which has previously been regulated. NewVector 
and Mountain Bell submit that this contention is incorrect 
because the Commission does not have jurisdiction over paging and 
the Rule is an interpretation of the statute affecting a general 
class of persons. It is also incorrect based upon the Court's 
holding in Williams, 
The premise of Industrial Communications1 argument that 
paging could only be deregulated through an exemption proceeding 
under the PTUL is that the Commission has jurisdiction over 
paging. As demonstrated in Point III, that premise is incorrect. 
Furthermore, it must be noted that deregulation and exemption are 
not the same thing. Deregulation implies that the Commission 
cannot regulate. Exemption implies that the Commission may regu-
late but chooses not to for reasons specified in Section 54-8b-3. 
Section 54-8b-7 makes absolutely clear the distinction between 
deregulation and exemption in providing that the Commission 
retains continuous jurisdiction over exempted services and may 
revoke or modify the exemption at any time after notice and 
hearing. 
Section 63-46a-2(a) defines a rule as follows: 
"Rule" means a statement made by an agency 
that applies to a general class of persons 
and: (i) implements or interprets policy made 
by statute . . . . 
The Rule clearly is a statement applicable to a general 
class of persons which implements or interprets the definition of 
public utility as applied to paging. Therefore, it is an 
appropriate subject for rulemaking. 
In Williams , which is the law of the case insofar as the 
Rule is concerned, the Court said: 
Under all these circumstances, we conclude 
that the Commission cannot reverse its long-
settled position regarding the scope of its 
jurisdiction and announce a fundamental policy 
change without following the requirements of 
the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act. • • • 
Because the requirements of the Act were not 
satisfied, the rule is vacated and the matter 
is remanded for further proceedings. 
720 P.2d at 777. 
The rule referred to in Williams was the June 3, 1983 
letter from the Commission to American Paging informally inter-
preting the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction not to include 
one-way paging. 720 P.2d at 774. That letter was admittedly 
adopted without compliance with the UARA. Here, the Rule was 
adopted strictly in compliance with the UARA and at the invita-
tion of the Williams Court. Industrial Communications' effort to 
fault the Commission for following the Court's direction in 
Williams is inexplicable and unpersuasive. 
Adoption of the Rule was an appropriate way to let the 
world know that persons proposing to offer one-way paging service 
in Utah need not apply for certificates or submit to regulation 
of the Commission. It was also an appropriate way to let 
existing providers know that they are free to compete in the 
market without the necessity of filing tariffs every time they 
wish to change prices or terms of service. 
V. 
THE RULE IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
Industrial Communications makes the novel argument that 
the Rule, by declaring that the Commission does not have juris-
diction to regulate paging, is an unconstitutional taking because 
it deprives Industrial Communications and other certificate 
holders of their valuable certificates without compensation. The 
briefs of the Commission and American Paging adequately point out 
the fallacies of that argument* NewVector and Mountain Bell wish 
only to add two comments. 
First, these parties are unaware of any public utility 
case in which it has been argued, let alone held, that removal of 
regulation is a deprivation of property. Cases that recognize 
the proper constitutional limitations on regulation are concerned 
with the interference that regulation imposes on the use and 
enjoyment of private property. See e.g. State of Missouri ex 
rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission 
of Missouri, 262 U.S. 281 (1923); Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public 
Service Commission, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542 (1944). 
Second, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution are limited in their application to takings for 
public use. Industrial Communications' certificate has not been 
taken for public use; it has been voided prospectively. No 
unconstitutional taking has occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that these cases should be 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Industrial Communica-
tions failed to seek review or rehearing by the Commission and 
failed to test the validity of the Rule in a declaratory judgment 
action in district court. If the Court determines that it has 
jurisdiction to review the Order and Rulef it is respectfully 
submitted that the Order and Rule should be affirmed because the 
Commission does not have jurisdiction over one-way paging and 
because adoption of the Rule was an appropriate method to correct 
the Commission's prior inadvertent and erroneous regulation of 
paging. 
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54-2-1. Terms defined — Utilities subject to jurisdiction and 
regulation* 
When used in this title: 
* * * 
(20)(a) "Public utility" includes every common carrier, gas 
corporation/ electrical corporation/ wholesale electrical 
cooperative/ telephone corporation/ telegraph corporation/ water 
corporation/ sewerage corporation, heat corporation/ independent 
energy producer not described in Subsection (e)f and the ware-
houseman where the service is performed for, or the commodity 
delivered tof the public generally, or in the case of a gas cor-
poration or electrical corporation where the gas or electricity 
is sold or furnished to any member or consumers within the state 
for domestic/ commercial/ or industrial use. 
(30) "Telephone corporation" includes every corporation and 
personf their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, 
controlling, operating, or managing any telephone line for public 
service within this state, provided, however, that all cor-
porations, partnerships, or firms providing intrastate cellular 
telephone service shall cease to be "telephone corporations" nine 
months after both the wire-line and the nonwire-line cellular 
service providers have been issued covering licenses by the 
Federal Communications Commission. It does not include any per-
son which provides, on a resale basis, any telephone or telecom-
munication service which is purchased from a telephone 
corporation. 
(31) "Telephone line" includes all conduits, ducts, poles, 
wires, cables, instruments, and appliances, and all other real 
estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, 
operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate com-
munication by telephone whether that communication is had with or 
without the use of transmission wires. 
All statutes are set forth in this addendum as they appear in 
the 1986 replacement volumes of the Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
54-4-1. General jurisdiction. 
The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction 
to supervise and regulate every public utility in this state, and 
to supervise all of the business of every such public utility in 
this state, and to do all things, whether herein specifically 
designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary or con-
venient in the exercise of such oower and jurisdiction; provided, 
however, that the department of transportation shall have juris-
diction over those safety functions transferred to it by the 
Department of Transportation Act. 
54-7-15• Review or rehearing by commission — Application — 
Procedure — Prerequisite to court action. 
Before any party, stockholder, bondholder, or other person 
pecuniarily interested in the public utility who is dissatisfied 
with an order or decision of the commission may commence legal 
action, the aggrieved party or person shall first proceed as pro-
vided in this section. 
(1) After any order or decision has been made by the 
commission any party to the action or proceeding, or any 
stockholder or bondholder or other party pecuniarily 
interested in the public utility affected, may apply for 
review or rehearing in respect to any matters determined in 
said action or proceeding specified in the applciation. The 
applicant shall make application to the commission for review 
or rehearing within 20 days after the issuance date of the 
order or decision. The application shall set forth specifi-
cally the grounds on which the applicant considers such deci-
sion or order to be unlawful. No applicant shall in any 
court urge or rely on any ground not set forth in the appli-
cation. Any application for review or rehearing made ten 
days or more before the effective date of the order as to 
which review or rehearing is sought shall be either granted 
or denied before such effective date, or the order shall 
stand suspended until the application is granted or denied. 
Any application for review or rehearing made within less than 
ten days before the effective date of the order as to which 
review or rehearing is sought, and not granted within 20 
days, may be taken by the party making the applciation to be 
denied, unless the effective date of the order is extended 
for the period of the pendency of the application. If any 
application for review or rehearing is granted without a 
suspension of the order involved, the commission shall forth-
with proceed to dispose of the matter with all dispatch and 
shall determine the same within 20 days after final sub-
mission, and, if such determination is not made within said 
time, it may be take by any party to the review or rehearing 
that the order involved is affirmed. An application for 
review or rehearing shall not excuse any corporation or per-
son from complying with and obeying any order or decision or 
with any requirement of any order or decision of the com-
mission therefore made, or operate in any manner to stay or 
postpone the enforcement thereof, except as herein otherwise 
provdied, and except in such cases and upon such terms as the 
commission may by order direct. 
(2) (a) The Commission upon receipt of an application 
for review shall, after review, proceed to grant or deny 
the application. If the application is granted, the 
commmission shall review the entire record on matters 
covered in the application and shall affirm, abrogate, 
change, or modify the original order or decision as it 
deems proper. 
(b) If the application is for rehearing, the com-
mission, after review of the entire record on matters 
covered in the application, may either grant the appli-
cation or determine that there is insufficient reason to 
grant a rehearing, in which event, it shall deny the 
application, but it may affirm, abrogate, change, or 
modify its original order or decision as it deems 
proper. If a rehearing is granted, the commission, 
after rehearing and after considering all the facts 
including those arising after the original order or 
decision, shall affirm, abrogate, change, or modify its 
original order or decision as it deems proper. 
(c) Any order or decision which abrogates, changes 
or modifies an original order or decision shall have the 
same force and effect as an original order or decision, 
but shall not affect any right or the enforcement of any 
right arising from or by virtue of the original order or 
decision unless so ordered by the commission. 
54-7-16. Certiorari — Findings conclusive — Exclusive 
jurisdiction of Supreme Court. 
Within thirty days after the application for a rehearing is 
denied, or, if the application is granted, within thirty days 
after the rendition of the decision on rehearing, the applicant 
or any party to the proceeding deeming himself aggrieved by such 
order or decision rendered upon rehearing may apply to the 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari for the purpose of having 
the lawfulness of the original order or decision, or the order or 
decision on rehearing, inquired into and determined. Such writ 
shall be made returnable not later than thirty days after the 
date of the issuance thereof, and shall direct the commission to 
certify its record in the case to the court. Immediately after 
the service of the writ the commission shall cause notice of the 
pendency of the writ to be served upon each party to the action 
or proceeding in which the order or decision was rendered in the 
manner provided by § 54-7-9. On the return day the cause shall 
be heard by the Supreme Court, unless for good reason shown the 
same is continued. No new or additional evidence may be intro-
duced in the Supreme Court, but the cause shall be heard on the 
record of the commission as certified by it. The review shall 
not be extended further than to determine whether the commission 
has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of 
whether the order or decision under review violates any right of 
the petitioner under the Constitution of the United States or of 
the state of Utah. The findings and conclusions of the com-
mission on questions of fact shall be final and shall not be sub-
ject to review. Such questions of fact shall include ultimate 
facts and the findings and conclusions of the commission on 
reasonableness and discrimination. The commission and each party 
to the action or proceeding before the commission shall have the 
right to appear in the review proceedings. Upon the hearing the 
Supreme Court shall enter judgment either affirming or setting 
aside the order or decision of the commission. The provisions of 
the Code of Civil Procedure [Rules of Civil Procedure] relating 
to writs of review shall so far as applicable and not in conflict 
with the provisions of this chapter apply to proceedings insti-
tuted in the Supreme Court under the provisions of this section. 
No court of this state (except the Supreme Court to the extent 
herein specified) shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse, 
correct or annul any order or decision of the commission, or to 
suspend or delay the execution or operation thereof, or to enjoin, 
restrain or interfere with the commission in the performance of 
its official duties; provided, that the writ of mandamus shall 
lie from the Supreme Court to the commission in all proper cases. 
54-8b-l. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Public Telecommunications 
Utility Law." 
54-8b-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Commission" means the Public Service Commission. 
(2) "Intrastate telecommuncations service" means any 
telecommunications service in which the information transmitted 
originates and terminates within the boundaries of this state. 
(3) "Public telecommunications services" means the 
transmission of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, messa-
ges, data, or other information of any nature by wire, radio, 
lightwaves, or other electronmagnetic means offered to the public 
generally. 
(4) "Telecommunications corporation" means every cor-
poration and person, their lessees, trustees, receivers, trustees 
appointed by any court, owning, controlling, operating, managing, 
or reselling a public telecommunications service. 
54-8b-3« Commission jurisdiction over telecommunications — 
Exemptions from title allowed - Hearings and findings 
— Approval period• 
(1) The commission is vested with power and jurisdiction to 
partially or wholly exempt from any requirement of this title any 
telecommunications corporation or public telecommunications ser-
vice in this state. 
(2) The Commission, on its own initiative or in response to 
an application by a telecommunications corporation or a user of a 
public telecommunications service, may, after public notice and 
an opportunity for a hearing, make findings and issue an order 
specifying its requirements, terms, and conditions exempting any 
telecommunications corporation or any public telecommunications 
service from any requirement of this title either for a specific 
geographic area or in the entire state if the commission finds 
that the telecommunications corporation or service is subject to 
effective competition, that customers of the telecommunications 
corporation or service have reasonably available alternatives, 
and that the telecommunications corporation or service does not 
serve a captive customer base, and if such exemption is in the 
public interest of the citizens of the state. In determining 
whether to exempt any telecommunications corporation or public 
telecommunications service from any requirement of this title, 
the commission shall consider all relevant factors including, but 
not limited to: (a) the number of other providers offering simi-
lar services; (b) the intrastate market power and market share 
within the state of Utah of the telecommunications corporation 
requesting an exemption; (c) the intrastate market power and 
market share of other provides; (d) the existence of other provi-
ders to make functionally equivalent services readily available 
at competitive rates, terms, and conditions; (e) the effect of 
exemption on the regulated revenue requirements of the telecom-
munications corporation requesting an exemption; (f) the ease of 
entry of other providers into the marketplace; (g) the overall 
impact of exemption on the public interest; (h) the integrity of 
all service providers in the proposed market; (i) the cost of 
providing such service; (j) the economic impact on existing tele-
communications corporations; and (k) whether competition will 
promote the provision of adequate services at just and reasonable 
rates. 
(3) The commission shall approve or deny any application for 
exemption under this section within 240 days, except that the 
commission may by order defer action for an additional 30-day 
period. If the commission has not acted on any application 
within the permitted time period, the application shall be deemed 
granted. 
54-8b-9« Commission's jurisidction under other provisions of 
title not enlarged or reduced by chapter• 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to enlarge or 
reduce the commission's jurisdiction over the services and enti-
ties for which jurisdiction is provided or excluded by other pro-
visions of this title. 
63-46a-l. Short title* 
This act is known as the "Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act." 
63-46a-2* Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Agency" means each state board, commission, institu-
tion, department, division, officer, or other state government 
entity other than the Legislature, its committees, the political 
subdivisions of the state, or the courts, which is authorized or 
required by law to make rules, adjudicate, grant or withhold 
licenses, grant or withhold relief from legal obligations, or 
perform other similar actions or duties delegated by law, 
(2) "Bulletin" means the Utah State Bulletin. 
(3) "Effective" means operative and enforceable. 
(4) (a) "File" means to submit a document to the office as 
prescribed by this chapter. 
(b) "Filing date" means the day and time the document 
is recorded as received by the office. 
(5) "Office" means the Office of Administrative Rules, which 
is under the supervision of the Department of Administrative 
Services. 
(6) "Person" means any individual, partnership, corporation, 
association, governmental subdivision, or public or private orga-
nization of any character other than an agency. 
(7) "Publication" means making a rule available to the public 
by printing the rule or a summary of the rule in the bulletin. 
"Publication date" means the inscribed date of the bulletin. 
(8) (a) "Rule" means a statement made by an agency that 
applies to a general class of persons, rather than specific 
persons and: (i) implements or interprets policy made by 
statute; or (ii) prescirbes the policy of the agency in the 
absence of express stautory policy; or (iii) prescribes the 
administration of the agency's functions or describes its 
organization, procedures, and operations. "Rule" includes 
the amendment or repeal of an existing rule. 
(b) "Rule" does not include: (i) statements concerning 
only the internal management of an agency and which do not 
affect private persons as a class, other agencies, or other 
governmental entities; (ii) declaratory rulings pursuant to § 
63-46a-14; or (iii) executive orders. 
63-46a-13« Declaratory judgment to determine validity of rule# 
(1) The validity or applicability of a rule may be determined 
in an action for declaratory judgment in any district court of 
this state with appropriate venue, if it is alleged that the 
rule, or its potential application, interferes with or impairs, 
or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or 
privileges of the plaintiff. 
(2) In an action for declaratory judgment on a rule, the 
agency shall be made a party to the action. 
(3) A declaratory judgment by a court may be rendered 
whether or not the plaintiff has requested the agency to pass 
upon the applicability of the rule in question. However, the 
issue of applicability may not be determined by the district 
court while the issue is under consideration by the agency during 
any proceeding pending before that agency or during the time the 
agency's decision concerning applicability is subject to appeal 
or being considered on appeal. 
ADDENDUM B 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SErVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter cf the Amplica-
tion Of PAGE AMERICA OF*UTAH, 
INC. for a Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity as a 
Ccrjnon Carrier for Furnismng 
Pacing Service to Areas Witnin 
Salt Lake, Davis, Utan, and 





EP ON MOTION 
" „' •" w " "" ™ ^ 
Appearances: 
Stephen R. Handle For Applicant 
Stuart L. Pcelr.an " Arerican Pag::: cf Utan, 
Inc., amicus curiae 




?.. M. lewis " Mobile Telephone, Inc., 
Protestant 
Fichard Hinckley, " Division cf Puclic 
Assistant Attorney Utilities, Decartrer.t of 
General Business Reculaticn, 
State cf Utan 
By the Cordissicn: 
Aoolicant filed its aoolicaticn in this natter AUCH,,C*" 13 
1983. Subsequent thereto, the question arose wr.ether tne Ccrris-
sicn had ;urisdicticn to entertain said application, and tne 
Ccmission asxed fcr oriefs en tne matter. The parties thereaf-
ter asxed for an evidentiary nearmc for the purpose cf develop-
ing the record to describe the nature of their respective busi-
ness operations as a basic fcr resolving the jurisdictional 
issue. Said hearing took place on Noverrjoer 7, 1983, at the hcur 
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of 2:00 p.m., before A. Robert Thurman, Administrative Law Judge 
for the Commission. Evidence was offered and received, and the 
Administrative Law Judge, having considered the same, together 
with the briefs submitted, new enters the following Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order based thereon. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Page America of Utah, Inc., hereafter called "Appli-
cant" is a corporation organized and existing under the lavs of 
the State of Utah, with its principal office at Salt Lake City, 
Utah. It is a subsidiary of Page America Group, Inc., a holding 
company with operating companies in a large number of states 
nationwide. Applicant's position is supported by American 
Paging, Inc., appearing as amicus curiae, hereafter called 
"American," a corporation qualified to do business in the state 
of Utah, and which is already operating a paging service, though 
without certification from this Commission. The application is 
opposed by David R. Williams, dba Industrial Communications, 
hereafter called "Industrial", and by Mobile Telephone, Inc., a 
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of 
Utah, hereafter called "MTI". The Division of Public Utilities 
also epposes the present motion of the Applicant for an exempt 
certificate, and instead asks the Commission to exercise limited 
regulatory oversight of pacing service, similar to that which we 
exercise over WATS resellers. 
2. Both of the protestants currently hold certificates of 
convenience and necessity from this Commission authorizing them 
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to prcvide mobile radio-telephone service in various parts cf the 
state, and in conjunction therewith to operate paging service as 
well. The grants of authority have been nade at various times, 
and with a single exception have provided for authority to 
operate both mobile telephone and paging service. In 1974, the 
Commission issued a certificate to Mobile Telephone Service of 
Southern Utah, Inc. (which corporation is not a Protestant in 
this case) in Case Mo. 6969 which dealt exclusively with the 
provision cf paging service, and the Protestants cite that case 
to the Commission as determmitive that the Commission has 
already decided the jurisdictional issue herein. In one case, to 
be discussed hereafter, the Commission did assert jurisdiction 
over such service, but that case was reversed by the Utah Supreme 
Court, and in view cf the Court's disposition of the same, we do 
not consider ourselves bound by it. As we will discuss hereaf-
ter, we do net believe that the Supreme Court has ruled in 
respect to the Commission's jurisdiction ever caging services. 
3. Paging technology has been developing extremely rapidly 
over the past ten to fifteen years. Prior to that time, substan-
tially the only method people had of ensuring that they be 
apprised of all calls when they were away from the phone, was to 
employ an answering service. The calling party would leave a 
message with the answering service, to be relayed when the 
customer of the answering service phoned in to get the messages. 
There was no way to let the customer know immediately when a 
message had been left. 
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4, The first electronic improvement was a tone-only 
"beeper". This was an electronic device which could be activated 
by a radio signal from the answering service providing a high-
pitch tone to alert the customer that a message was waiting. The 
most primitive form of this system involves a human activating 
the beeper and giving the customer a message when the customer 
phones in* In almost all cases this primitive system has been 
superseded by a machine which automatically activates the beeper 
and then plays back the caller's message when the customer phones 
in. 
5. The next advance in technology was to provide "tone-two 
address" service which would enable a customer, by the type of 
the tone, to discern which of two numbers to call to get mes-
sages. This type of service has in turn been superseded by "tone 
and voice" service, which allows a person to hear the messace 
after the beeper is activated, thus sparing the necessity of 
phoning in to get messages. New en the horizon are two further 
advances in the technology: digital display (already available) 
which will display the message in numeric form, obviously in most 
cases directing the customer which telephone number to call tc 
reach the caller. Digital display is already available in many 
parts of the country and has very recently been introduced in the 
Salt Lake market. It is likely to be superseded quite scon by an 
"alpha-numeric" display which will enable the customer to receive 
a short written message as well as numeric data. 
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6. It is new foreseeable that in the near future the 
alpha-numeric display will enable the customer to use the ser-
vices of a "network," which will link him to data bases, and will 
enable him to use his service nationwide. The Applicant and 
American are each involved in establishing such a network. !icr.e 
of the existing certificated carriers in Utah have taken concrete 
steps in such a direction. 
7, Despite the rapid advances in the technology, and the 
potential for greater usefulness, the essential structure of the 
service remains the same. A caller uses the telephone system to 
reach the service and leave a message. The message is stored. 
There is then a retransmission, either to alert the customer that 
there is a message, or to send it directly for voice or display. 
The retransmission may or may not involve use of the land lines. 
The service requires, by way of equipment, some means of answer-
ing the calls, storing the messages, transmitting the alert 
signal, and replaying the stored message. The only part which 
must be done electronically is the transmission of the alert 
signal. Obviously, a manual system for the other part of the 
operation would be intolerably cumbersome, and hence automated 
equipment to handle these aspects has been available for seme 
time. Although this renders the establishment of such a system 
expensive, nevertheless, if one compares the capital of such an 
operation with that required for a land line telephone system, or 
similar fixed utility, they are relatively modest. Furthermore, 
the operation of such a system dees not involve the installation 
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and maintenance of a wide-spread, expensive pnysical distribution 
system. 
8. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has al-
located two primary bands for paging service. One, commonly 
known as the "high band," lies around 900 MHz. "Low band" lies 
around 35 and 43 MHz. The FCC has recently allocated 63 addi-
tional channels for the "high band" and 28 channels in the "low 
band". Between them, the two bands have had only eight channels 
heretofore. The FCC has also considerably liberalized its 
criteria for granting new licenses on these bands. 
9. In the wake of the FCC allocation of additional chan-
nels , and relaxation of licensing requirements, there has been a 
perceptible trend in a number of states toward relaxing regu-
lation of paging services, or deregulating them altogether. 
10. At present, the Applicant's subsidiaries in a number of 
otner states are offering tone and voice paging, digital paging, 
and m sore cases alpha-numeric paging. They propose to offer 
all forms immediately, should they be granted authority, with the 
possible exception of alpha-numeric, which may be delayed slight-
ly for technical reasons. They also propose to offer networx 
paging as soon as it is available. American offers the same 
present capabilities, and proposes the same future service. MTI 
presently offers ail forms except alpna-numeric. MTI has begun 
investigating possible network affiliation, but has no concrete 
plans at present. Industrial can presently offer tone, and tone 
and voice. It has the technical capabilities of offering 
CASE NO. 9 3-082-01 
- 7 -
digital, but at present has no frequencies available to it for 
that purpose. It expects they will be available, and it proposes 
to offer such service as soon as it is possible. 
CQNCLUSICNS OF LAW 
1. The issue turns upon the construction of Utah Cede 
Annotated 54-2-1 (22) , which gives regulatory jurisdiction to the 
Commission over telephone corporations as defined therein. An 
integral part of that definition incorporates a separate defini-
tion of a •telephone line" which U.C.A. 54-2-1 (21) defines to be 
"all conduits, ducts, coles, wires, cables, 
instruments and appliances, and all other 
reai estate and fixtures and personal proper-
ty owned, controlled, operated, or managed in 
connection with or to facilitate communica-
tion by telephone whetner such communication 
is had with or without the use of trans-
mission wires." 
2. Because the Utan statute uses the terms "facilitate 
communication by telephone whether such communication is had with 
or without the use of transmission wires," it simply is not clear 
that the Legislature specifically intended to include one-way 
paging service within the regulatory 3urisdicticn of this Commis-
sion. In construing its jurisdiction as a matter of first 
impression, the Commission first considers the plain meaning of 
the underlying statute. Where the statute is ambiguous, as here, 
we examine the decisions of courts for guidance in construing the 
law; and where reasonably direct guidance is lacking in author-
itative case law, we endeavor to apply a prudent judgment ground-
ed in our regulatory experience which takes into account the 
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philosophical and economic bases for affording certain enter-
prises the unique status of regulated monopolies, as well as 
considerations of public interest in receiving necessary utility 
service. The parties in this matter have referred the Commission 
to many cases from our own and other states, some of which have 
opted for a regulatory plan for paging service, and some whicn 
have not* The weight of case authority is split, and we ars 
persuaded by our review of Utah cases that the Utah Supreme Court 
has never squarely addressed the Commission's jurisdiction over 
paging service, 
3. In the 1974 Mobile Telecncne Service of Souther** Utah 
case (No* 6969) , the Commission granted a paging certificate; 
however, two facts are significant with respect to that decision. 
First, the application does not appear to have been contested, 
and therefore the issue of jurisdiction was not argued before the 
Commission m an adversarial context. Second, the Commission made 
no findings nor conclusions from which it may be inferred that 
the issue of jurisdiction was ever fully considered, and for 
whatever reason, the Commission failed to declare that it had 
jurisdiction to issue the certificate. We conclude as a ratter 
of law that the Commission had no such jurisdiction, and that the 
order in that case was null and void. We further conclude that 
the inclusion of paging service m any certificates issued by the 
Commission, authorizing the holders to provide rrcbile telephone 
service, was error, and that the portions of orders conferring 
authority to provide paging service are null and void. 
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4. Protestants refer to the Corliss ion' s Order In t.ue 
Matter of the Investigation of the Practices and Operations of 
Medic-Call, a corporation, Harold Jensen, M.D., Professional 
Exchance Answering Service and Industrial Communications Ccrcany, 
Investigation Docket No, 120 (1969), in support of the proposi-
tion that this Ccrnmission has already squarely faced and decided 
the issue of its jurisdiction over paging services. However, as 
we see it, the debate m that proceeding was over the question of 
whether or not Medic-Call was offering its service to the public 
generally, whereas, in the instant proceeding the debate is over 
different questions, one of which is whether or not a pacing 
service is a telephone corporation within the meaning of our 
statutes. We note that in Medic-Call v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 24 Utah 2d 273, 470 P.2d 253 (1970), which is the appeal of 
the Commission's Crder in Investigation Docket No. 120, the Court 
in its opinion merely assumes arguendo that a paging service is a 
telephone corporation: here we cannot so assume. 
It is also worthwnile to note the rather stinging dicta of 
the Court in Medic-Call; 
"The service (caging service) is compa-
rable to that wnicn would be rendered by 
runners or call boys to notify doctors that 
they were wanted on the phone. One wonders 
3ust how the defendant would go about reg-
ulating the service even if it had the power 
to do so. If defendants can regulate the 
service rendered by plaintiffs herein, could 
they not with equal propriety regulate the 
semaphore signaling of the Boy Scouts or the 
smc.Ke signals of the Indians on a hunting 
expedition?" (at page 260, 470 P.2d) 
B-9 
CASE NO, 33-082-01 
- 10 -
Protestants cite the opinion of the Supreme Court in 
Williams v. Hvrun Gibbons & Sens Co., 602 P.2d 634 (1979), to 
demonstrate that the term "telephone line" includes the plant, 
equipment and facilities used to provide paging services. In 
Williams the Court construed the meaning of "telephone line" but 
did so by stating only that the phrase included "radio-telephone 
communications," The Williams case presented the issue to the 
Court in the context of an eminent domain proceeding, and the 
question of whether plaintiff had condemnation powers required a 
finding that the plaintiff was in fact a public utility. The 
business of the plaintiff for which eminent domain had been 
sought was to install a transmitter to operate radio telephone 
and paging service. The Court didn't specify that paging is to 
be treated within the definition of a "telephone line" but relied 
more generally on "radio-telecnone communications" as failing 
within the broad definition ("whether with or without trans-
mission wires") without identifying services which constitute 
radio-telephone communications. Clearly, mobile telephone 
service is within the meaning of the statute, and the case can be 
said to stand for that; however, we conclude that the nature of 
pacing sen/ice is so fundamentally distinct and different from 
mobile telephone service that the Court's language in that case 
falls short of declaring paging to be a telephone line. 
We read the fleeting references to paging service m the 
cases to mean that paging has been a distinctly separate service 
which companies have offered adjunctively to their customers 
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because the service can technologically dovetail with mcbil* 
telephone service? but the two are net the sane in fact, nor 
should they be treated the same in law. 
5. The distinction between paging and telephone service is 
critical because if in defining "telephone line11 one focuses on 
the phrase "facilitate telephone communication," the scope of 
potentially regulated services becomes staggering. Conceivably 
the Commission should then regulate all suppliers of telephone 
equipment, e.g. Radio Shack, Sears, J.C.Penney, Panasonic? 
suppliers of wiring components; all suppliers of telephone 
directories, including the many not affiliated with the Bell 
system; telephone answering services, telephone answering devices 
and all such suppliers; radio talk stations; newspaper classified 
advertising, jad absurdum. The focus instead should be on the 
connotation of telephone service which implies interactive, and 
at least potentially extended two-way communication. That was 
certainly the focus in 1917 when the statute was enacted, since 
most of the services new technologically feasible were not 
foreseen at that time. Paging service is conceptually no differ-
ent from answering services (which have never been considered 
appropriate objects cf state regulation); it is the same service 
offered through a different medium. Telephone service over land 
lines or radio waves is fundamentally the same service irrespec-
tive of the means of transmission. But telephone service is a 
two-way service; paging service is one-way call notificaticn. 
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6. Finally, we consider it appropriate to evaluate paging 
service in the context of the traditional characteristics which 
have warranted granting of a state-regulated monopoly. Histor-
ically, legislatures have narrowly circumscribed the conditions 
which justify such a departure from a free market economy. Those 
conditions have generally included the providing of a service 
which is deemed necessary and essential to the citizenry, the 
existence of natural monopolies because of significant capital 
investment necessary to achieve economies of scale in production, 
and the efficient use of minimally intrusive rights of way across 
land. An objective analysis of paging service persuades us to 
conclude the following: 
(a) Paging is a valuable convenience for a small but 
growing number of people. Industrial presented information to 
the effect that it has the capacity to serve 200,000 paging 
subscribers, but presently serves approximately 2,500 subscrib-
ers. While paging is beneficial and efficient in aiding instant 
response to telephone calls, we cannot say that the service is a 
necessary public service in the sense that water, electricity, 
natural gas and basic telephone service are necessary to the 
well-being of the citizenry, nor can it be said that a signifi-
cant number of telephone customers avail themselves of the 
service. 
(b) The capital necessary to provide paging service is net 
substantial compared tc the capital commitments common to other 
utility services. 
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te) The public is not inconvenienced by the plant or 
transmission of paging signals in the way it would be inconve-
nienced by unlimited electric companies seeking transmission 
rights of way. Whether there are three or three hundred paging 
companies, the intrusion upon land would be minimal. 
(d) Paging may have been a service in short supply because 
the FCC imposed severe limits to market entry by restricting 
frequencies within the RF spectrum; however, the FCC decision to 
release 96 new frequencies significantly alters the supply 
consideration and represents a major federal policy to liberalize 
market access and fester competition in the paging industry. 
(e) If competition can produce service and price benefits 
to paging customers, there would appear to be no substantial 
reason for this Commission to exercise jurisdiction. Certainly 
there would be obvious advantages to the Protestants if marker 
entry were restricted, but the purpose of state regulation isn't 
to protect the interests of regulated companies for their own 
sake; it is to protect the public interest. Conceivably, there 
will be many market entrants, and it is likely that seme will 
flourish and some will fail. We see no significant risk to the 
public if some providers fail, and we are persuaded that the open 
market will in time be the best safeguard of the public interest, 
both in terms of price and service. 
(f) The Protestants urge the Commission to assert jurisdic-
tion to preclude duplication of facilities, but duplication is 
the essence of competition, and such a policy would be rational 
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only if the investment necessary to launch a paging service were 
vastly greater than it is. 
7. The issues raised herein demonstrate that it is an 
appropriate time to request that our Legislature modernize the 
definition cf telephone service. The questions in this case, as 
well as the the Ccmmission's decision to assert limited regulato-
ry oversight of WATS resellers, and the restructuring of the 
telephone industry incident to the break-up of the Bell System 
merit a careful evaluation of what ought to be regulated and what 
cannot be regulated in order to better serve the communication 
requirements of Utahns. We are attempting to crunch the tech-
nology of 1983 into the terminology cf 1917, and there are too 
many technological and economic developments to make ambiguous 
definitions advisable or workable. 
Accordingly, we make the following Order: 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the application 
of Page America of Utah, Inc. be, and the same hereby is, dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the authority of Mobile Tele-
phone, Inc., Certificate No. 1414 issued in Case No. 5169, 
insofar as the same purports to grant authority for paging 
service be, and the same hereby is, hereby amended to delete 
therefrom any reference to paging service, and that: a copy cf 
this Order be filed and made effective in said case; and 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity No, 1504 issued in Case No. 5482 to David R. Williams, 
dba Industrial Communications, be, and the same hereby is, 
amended to delete therefrom any reference to mobile paging 
service? and that a copy of this Order be filed and made effec-
tive in said case. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the authority of Mobile Tele-
phone Service of Southern Utah Inc., Certificate No. 1856 issued 
in Case No. 6969, insofar as the same grants authority for paging 
service, is hereby voided, and that a copy of this Order be filed 
and made effective m said case. 
DATED at Salt La*e City, Utah, this 28th day of November, 
1983. 
/s/ A. Robert Thurran, 
Administrative law Jucre 
Approved and confirmed this 28th day of November, 1982, as 
the Report and Order of the Commission. 
/s/ Brent H. Cameron, Chairman 
(SEAL) I si David R. Ir^ 'ine » Ccmmissicrer 
/s/ James M. 3vrne, Commissioner 
r u ir • - • - " — •-•- • -- • - r .. ..i • • 
Attest: 
/s/ Gecrcia 2. Petersen, Secretarv 
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ADDENDUM D 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Applica- ) 
tion Of AMERICAN PAGING, INC. ) 
(OF UTAHi for a Certificate of ) 
Convenience and Necessity to ) CASE NO. 85-2007-01 
Operate as a Public Utility ) 
Rendering Paging Service to the ) ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
General Public in Areas of Box ) TO DISMISS 
Elder, Weber, Morgan, Davis, ) 
Salt Lake, Utah, Summit, Wasatch) 
and Tooele Counties, Utah. ) 
ISSUED: May 23, 1986 
By the Commission: 
On or about August 10, 1983, Page America Inc. filed an 
application with the Commission to provide one-way paging ser-
vice. On November 28, 1983, however, the Commission ruled that 
it had no statutory jurisdiction over paging services. The case 
was subsequently appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. 
On or about April 30, 1985 American Paging Inc. (Ameri-
can Paging) filed an application with the Commission to provide 
one-way paging service to the general public between points in 
Box Elder, Weber, Morgan, Davis, Salt Lake, Utah, Summit, Wasatch 
and Tooele Counties within that area. American Paging filed 
simultaneously a Motion to Dismiss its Application for the reason 
that the Commission, in its Order of November 28, 1983, had 
determined that it did not have jurisdiction to regulate one-way 
paging services. American Paging also stated that although the 
1985 Utah Legislature amended the Public Utilities Act by adding 
Chapter 8b. empowering the Commission to wholly or partially 
exempt certain competitive telecommunication services or service 
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providers, said chapter did not expand the Commission's jurisdic-
tion beyond that which it already had. 
On or about March 4, 1986, the Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that the Commission's deregulation of one-way paging was defec-
tive because the Commission had attempted the deregulation 
through an Order construing its jurisdiction rather than through 
rulemaking under the Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
Thereafter, in accord with the instruction of the 
Supreme Court, the Commission filed a notice of proposed rule-
making with the Office of Administrative Rules on April 15, 1986, 
which stated that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over 
one-way paging and the reasons for it. Notice was provided to 
the parties. No party requested a hearing within the 15-day 
period following publication as required by the Utah Administra-
tive Rulemaking Act. The rule was formally adopted and made 
effective May 16, 1986. 
The Commission further concludes from the comments and 
oral arguments of the parties that Chapter 8B of the Public 
Utilities Act of the Utah Code does not expand the jurisdiction 
of the Commission to include one-way paging. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission will make the 
following: 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the Commis-
sion, having issued a rule pursuant to the Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act and in accord with the direction of the Utah 
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Supreme Court that it does not have jurisdiction over one-way 
paging services and having further determined that Chapter 8B of 
the Public Utilities Act does not expand the jurisdiction of the 
Commission to include one-way paging, hereby grants American 
Paging's Motion to Dismiss its Application for a Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity to provide one-way paging services. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this ?3rd day of May, 
1986. 
I si Brent H. Cameron, Chairman 
(SEAL) Is/ James M. Byrne, Commissioner 
I si Brian T. Stewart, Commissioner 
Attest: 
I si Georgia B. Peterson, Secretary 
